v. Stole
Gen 30:33 all .. I must be taken as from h
Exo 22:3 if he does not have .. he will be sold for his h
Matt 15:19; Mar 7:22 from the heart come out .. the h
†¢Theft.
Source: Christian Bible Dictionary
tip, LEYE
vet, The Law of Moses punished the guilty of theft with full restitution, which was obtained, in case of need, by the sale of the possessions of the guilty, or by hiring the latter’s services until the sum stolen had been collected ( Ex. 20:15; Prov. 6:13; 22:22). When the stolen was an animal, it was necessary to return double if it was returned alive (Ex. 22:3-8). If the thief had sold the animal or had made it useless, he had to pay four times, if it was a sheep or a kid; and fivefold if it was beef or cattle (Ex. 22:1; 2 Sam. 12:6; Lk. 19:8). The gold and silver were to be returned with a fifth more. Kidnappers of people were punished with the death penalty (Ex. 21:16).
Source: New Illustrated Bible Dictionary
According to the definition commonly given to this behavior by moralists, there is theft when one seizes something belonging to another and – the rightful owner is reasonably opposed to that fact.
Theft has a double malice: in the first place it causes harm to others and also determines an unjust enrichment that contradicts the evangelical indications. Under this second aspect, theft always has a certain malice, while considering the first aspect, the seriousness varies according to the degree of damage caused to others. The moralists, commenting on the seventh commandment, have underlined the obligation to restore what was taken or to repair as far as possible the damage caused. On the contrary, they have paid less attention to the aspect of unjust enrichment due to theft, as if this tendency constituted a natural and totally obvious fact within a consumer culture that places the primary parameter of economic and social behavior in the expansion of profits. and therefore in enrichment. Today not only does theft exist at an interpersonal level (microcriminality), but it also spreads at times at the political, administrative, and business levels, in the sphere of organized bad life, and in relations between overdeveloped countries and areas of poverty. In this way it has acquired new aspects and unprecedented dimensions.
Thus, in light of such situations, a more careful review of “not stealing” is urgently needed, in tune with the evangelical perspective that imposes not increasing wealth according to worldly modules, making profit the purpose of existence and the only spring of action, calling man on the contrary to initiate new social relationships, made of solidarity, where it is stated that “what you have, you have to give it”, not to capitalize on it selfishly, but to put it in a circuit communicative that gives a concrete realization to the destination of the goods of the earth to all men.
G. Mattai
Bibl.: E. Chiavacci. Theft, in NDIM, 889 897′ M, Vidal, Moral de attitudes, III Moral social PS, Madrid 61991; A. Moncada, The culture of solidarity, Verbo Divino, Estella 1989.
PACOMIO, Luciano, Encyclopedic Theological Dictionary, Divine Word, Navarra, 1995
Source: Encyclopedic Theological Dictionary
MORAL THEOLOGY
SUMMARY
I. Definition and general concepts.
II. Malice and seriousness of the theft.
III. Violation of property that is not theft.
IV. The theft of those who defraud tax.
V. The unfair damage.
SAW. The duty to return.
I. Definition and general concepts
The definition of theft contained in all moral theology manuals from the 17th century to the present day is as follows: “Ablatio rei alienae, rationabiliter invito domino.” A literal translation could be this: “Owning what belongs to others, being the other reasonably against”. Some clarifications are necessary. Ablatio properly means “carry away”; but it goes without saying that it is a taking for one’s own benefit: stealing and damaging what belongs to others always constitutes a sin against /property and, consequently, against /justice in the strict sense (commutative justice); but theft differs from damage precisely because it aims to appropriate what belongs to another, and not simply to cause harm to others.
In theft, therefore, two elements of malice concur: the first (common to harm) is to cause harm to others; the second is unjust enrichment. Both elements will have to be taken into account in the problems that will arise later.
We must distinguish between theft and assault: the first is hidden; the second is a theft perpetrated openly before the owner, and is always linked in some way to violence, threats or intimidation. To the double malice of the theft, the assault adds a third element of malice: the vis, violence exerted on you.
The determination rationabiliter invito domino is of paramount importance. Certainly, if the owner is not against it, invitus, there is no theft, but legitimate transfer of property based on the convergence of wills. But it may happen that the owner is against it for unreasonable reasons, that is, it may be non rationabiliter invitus. There are, in effect, exceptional situations in which not wanting someone else to do what is theirs may be contrary to reason; therefore, whoever takes possession of other people’s things in such situations does not commit theft, even if the owner does not consent to it. Such situations will, of course, need to be carefully specified.
Finally, it is necessary to dwell on the concept of res aliena. The fact that a thing belongs to someone else implies a certain definition of property: a special bond between a person and a thing, in such a way that that thing is “his”. What does this link consist of?’-.gis to say, what does “property” mean, is the object of discussion. In all times and in all cultures there is certainly an idea of property. But it is equally true that the concept of property varies from culture to culture and from time to time within the same cultural area. A possible general definition, valid for all cultural contexts, could be the following: “exclusive availability, socially (and legally) guaranteed within socially (and legally) established limits”. By varying the concrete content of property, the concrete content of the notion of theft will obviously vary. In particular, the content of the domino rationabiliter invito clause will vary: the reasonableness of the opposition will obviously depend on the type of guarantee that a company offers for the availability of certain things.
We must take into account the fact that the concept of property present and operative in the moral doctrine of theft, as it is exposed in the manuals of moral theology from the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries, is the characteristic concept of western culture of the last centuries; this concept supposes an innovation of both patristic and scholastic doctrine and, in turn, has been modified in line with that great tradition by Gaudium et spes (69-71). The doctrine of the manuals assumes as a starting point, and as a doctrine of natural law, the concept of property rights as a natural right inherent to individuals regardless of their membership in a given society (or prior to joining it). This right is acquired, once and for all, when individuals come to own something legitimately, either by natural law or by positive law. Once the property title has been acquired by one of the legitimate means, ownership of what has been acquired is perpetual and inviolable, as an integral part of the person. The only thing that civil society can do is protect that right.
II. Malice and seriousness of the theft
In the conception of exposed property, theft is morally condemnable for the primary reason of being a violation of justice: theft is an unjust enrichment, contrary to the natural right of property. To this primary motive is added a secondary motive, that of causing damage to the neighbor in his material goods: unjust enrichment is always linked to unjust damage, while the opposite is not always true. Therefore, there may be a sin of unjust damage without there being theft. We will deal with it separately.
The question of the seriousness of the sin of theft has been the subject of lively discussions: the violation of justice is in itself something serious; but the object of the theft, formulated in monetary terms, can go from minimum values to very high values. Therefore, parvitas materiae is recognised: a serious moral disorder in itself can be slight (venial sin) if the object is of little relevance. But here the problem arises: the relevance of the stolen object may be low for the thief, but great for those who have suffered theft, and vice versa. A few pesetas stolen from a poor person can mean his sustenance; many millions stolen from a rich man may do him little harm.
To solve this problem, it is necessary to refer to the two reasons for malice in theft: unjust enrichment is serious if it is true enrichment, taking as a reference the average economic situation of the society in which one lives. There is an objective fact, although variable: what can be considered true enrichment is always serious matter, regardless of the damage caused to the person stolen (absolute gravis matter). But the damage caused can be serious even if the object of the theft has a value lower than what can be considered objective enrichment; There is, therefore, a gravity of matter related to the condition of the robbed person, that is, with a relative and non-objectively determinable datum. If the damage is serious, the matter should be considered serious, even if there is no real enrichment (matter relative gravis). The seriousness of the matter, and of the sin of theft, must be measured by the seriousness of the damage, although only up to a certain limit. Once the limit of true enrichment has been crossed, the matter will always be serious, even if the damage caused is slight; The absolute matter gravis serves, then, as a ceiling for the relative matter gravis; beyond that ceiling there is always mortal sin.
This point is important, because it demonstrates the sharpness and moral sensitivity of the manuals and because important consequences are derived from it in terms of the obligation of restitution (which must be imposed in sacramental confession); the strict obligation of restitution subsists, in effect, only when there is serious and certain fault.
In the conception of property exposed above, however, it does not seem that there is any moral evil in the fact of seeking enrichment; the only moral problem seems to be posed by how to seek enrichment. It is not against justice, nor is it generally a moral evil, the pursuit of riches. Now, if the pursuit of wealth (and not the reasonable and limited satisfaction of honest needs) is considered to be an evil, as the gospel certainly points out, then the primary malice of theft consists already in the fact that…