Temperance (Gr. enkráteia, “self-control”; enkratéuomai, “exercise self-control”; enkrates, “having self-control”; sofrí‡n, “prudent” or “having self-control”; Sí‡ fronismós, Sí‡fróní ‡yes, yes‡frosún’ ). A rather archaic term that appears in the RVR with the meaning of “temperance”, “self-control” and “having self-control”. Self-control is one of the great Christian graces (Gal. 5:23; 2Pe 1:6; etc.). It is essential to victory in the Christian race, as it is in athletic competition (1Co 9:25).
Source: Evangelical Bible Dictionary
Self-control (Act 24:25; Gal 5:23; 2Pe 1:6); discipline (1Co 9:25). It is not limited to abstinence from liquor. In Act 24:25 it refers to chastity. In 1Ti 3:2, 1Ti 3:11; Tit 2:2 (sober) is the opposite of drunk.
Source: Hispanic World Bible Dictionary
See “Sobriety.”
Christian Bible Dictionary
Dr. J. Dominguez
http://bible.com/dictionary/
Source: Christian Bible Dictionary
†¢Own domain.
Source: Christian Bible Dictionary
Virtue that governs the human appetite or desire for pleasure and sensible satisfaction. It is one of the four cardinal virtues and is understood to be configured by the dominance of various bodily tendencies: the reproductive one for chastity, the one for food for abstinence, the one for drink for sobriety, the one for possessions for detachment, that of other joys or pleasures through austerity and penance.
Temperance is closely linked to strength and supposes a timely and appropriate education for the age and circumstances.
(See Cardinal Virtues.)
Pedro Chico González, Dictionary of Catechesis and Religious Pedagogy, Editorial Bruño, Lima, Peru 2006
Source: Dictionary of Catechesis and Religious Pedagogy
(v. virtues).
(ESQUERDA BIFET, Juan, Dictionary of Evangelization, BAC, Madrid, 1998)
Source: Dictionary of Evangelization
The demand to virtuously discipline behavior, moderating the most intense human impulses and passions, is common to the ancient world. Indicated with various words by various authors, it has a wide semantic field aimed at highlighting, either the aspect of moderation in specific acts (special virtue), or that of moderation in the general attitude (general virtue), something like a condition of existence for other virtues.
In the Greek world one speaks of enkráteia (from enkracéo: ,’I am owner, I dominate’) or sophrosyne (from sophroneo. “I am not wise, moderate, continent” (Plato, Republic, 1V, 430-431 b). Aristotle (Ethica Nicomachea, 11, 7. III, 13) emphasizes rather the character of mesOtes, of “middle ground” of temperance.
Scholasticism (which places temperance among the four cardinal virtues, after prudence, justice and fortitude) makes an effort to harmonize the classical heritage with the strictly Christian aspects of biblical tradition (Rom 12,3.16; 1 Pe 4 7. Tit 2,6) and patristic (Saint Augustine, De moribus Ecclesiae, XV; Saint Ambrose, De officiis, XLIII), contributing to a further characterization of the virtue of temperance.
In the theological tradition, temperance as a particular virtue has as its object the impulses (passions) of the corporeality and, more specifically, of affectivity (vis appetitiva sensiciva of the scholastics) towards the pleasures inherent in certain acts: nutrition and generation. These are impulses rooted in the sphere of the instincts with diverse purposes, which can be reduced to aggressiveness (appeticus irascibilis, to which the virtue of strength corresponds) and to the conservation of the individual and of the species (appeticus concupiscibilis, moderated by the temperance).
The condition of possibility of the virtue of temperance resides in the structural capacity, constitutive of the sphere of the instincts, to be guided and oriented by reason. This fundamental intuition was already the patrimony of the ancients (it was especially elaborated by Aristotle in his doctrine on the division of the soul), and today it is a datum acquired from the ethological and anthropological sciences. Thus, temperance, as a virtue, refers to reason, but its operation depends on the structure of the human instinct capable of regulation, modification, orientation and organization (this is what Gehlen calls “instinct plasticity” ).
Temperance is made up of a set of virtues, some of which regulate the specifically nutritional and reproductive spheres (for example, sobriety, chastity), and others moderate various spheres of general behavior (for example, modesty, honesty, clemency, modesty, etc…).
Many of the virtues attached to temperance that appear in the scholastic treatises and in later manuals may be far removed from the current horizon, in which temperance is spoken of. In reality, the growing differentiation of the biological and human sciences (ethology, anthropology) in their specific object makes it necessary to consider temperance in the light of food science, the theory of instincts, and axiological theories.
From the moral point of view, this new approach implies the need to carefully point out the particular object of temperance in the various spheres.
T Rossi
Bibl.: Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, De temperantia, 11-11. qq, 141-170: U, Rocco, Temperance, in DE, III, 458-459: S, Canals, Ascética medisada, Rialp, Madrid 1974: Y Marcozzi, Ascesis y Psique, Reason and Faith. Madrid 1961: J Pieper, Prudence and temperance, Rialp, Madrid 1969.
PACOMIO, Luciano, Encyclopedic Theological Dictionary, Divine Word, Navarra, 1995
Source: Encyclopedic Theological Dictionary
(From the Latin temperare: to mix in correct proportions; to restrict).
In this article temperance is considered as one of the four cardinal virtues. It can be defined as the right habit that allows man to control his natural appetites for the pleasures of the senses according to the norm prescribed by reason. In a certain sense, temperance can be considered as a characteristic of all the moral virtues, since the moderation that it brings with it is central to each one of them. Saint Thomas Aquinas (II-II:141:2) also considers it a special virtue. Thus, it is the virtue that governs concupiscence or that which controls the desire for the pleasures and delights that most strongly attract the human heart. These can be classified into three types: those that are associated with the preservation of the human individual, those that are related to the perpetuation of the race, and those that are linked to the well-being and comfort of human life. In this aspect, temperance has other subordinate virtues: abstinence, chastity and modesty. Abstinence prescribes the control that must be employed in eating and drinking. Obviously, the measure of such self-control is neither constant nor invariable. It varies according to the people and the different purposes pursued. The diet of an anchorite is not suitable for a peasant or a worker. Abstinence is opposed to the vices of gluttony and drunkenness. The disorder of these is that food and drink are consumed in such a way as to harm rather than benefit bodily health; therefore, gluttony and drunkenness are said to be inherently evil. However, this does not mean that they always constitute grave sins. Gluttony rarely is; drunkenness is when it is complete, that is, when it destroys the use of reason during the time it lasts. Chastity, as part of temperance, regulates the sensual satisfactions connected with the perpetuation of the species. The opposite vice is lust. As these pleasures appeal with special vehemence to human nature, the function of chastity is to impose on them the force of reason. Thus, she will decide whether those pleasures should be totally restrained in obedience to a higher calling, or whether they should be endorsed solely in reference to the purposes of the marriage. (To see the thought of the Magisterium of the Church in this regard, Cf. Encyclicals “Casti connubi” by Pius XI, “Evangelium vitae” and “Familiaris consortio” by John Paul II and “Deus caritas est” by Benedict XVI, and the catechesis of the first four years of the pontificate of John Paul II, which constitute the body of the so-called “Theology of the Body”. Also, Catechism of the Catholic Church, Part 3, Section 2, chapter 2. NT). Chastity is not fanaticism, much less lack of sensitivity. It is simply obedience to a temperance mandate in an area where such stabilizing power is sorely needed.
The virtue of modesty, regulated by temperance, has the function of keeping the less violent human passions under the reins of reason. She uses humility to put the inside of man in order. By truly permeating his judgments, and increasing his self-awareness, it protects him against the radical malice of pride. It is contrary to faint-heartedness, which is born of inferior perceptions and an evil will. When it comes to governing the exterior of man, modesty tries to make him conform to the demands of decency and decorum (honest). In this way all outward appearance, conduct and lifestyle fall under his jurisdiction. Things such as clothing, the way of speaking and the way of life must be framed in his norms. Obviously, this can never be regulated by inflexible and elementary rules. Customs will always have something to say about it, but in turn they will have their property determined by modesty.
Santo Tomás lists other virtues subordinate to temperance in that they imply moderation in handling some passion. It must be taken into account, however, that in its primary and generally understood sense, temperance has to do with what is difficult for man, not insofar as he is a rational being, but insofar as he is an animal (also on this point it is recommended to refer to the documents suggested above. NT). The most arduous duties for flesh and blood are precisely self-control in the use of drinks, food, and the sexual pleasures that accompany the propagation of the species. That is why abstinence and chastity must be recognized as the main and ordinary phases of this virtue. Everything that has been said so far receives greater support if we accept that the self-control required by temperance is measured not only by the rule of reason, but also by Divine Law. It is called a cardinal virtue because the moderation required for every righteous habit is especially challenged in the practice of temperance. The satisfactions over which it must rule are both entirely natural and necessary in the present order of human existence. Despite this, it is not the greatest of moral virtues. That place is occupied by prudence; then come justice, fortitude, and finally temperance.
Source: Delany, Joseph….