The relationship between ethics and the human sciences, by its very nature, is not of an evaluative nature and, of itself, the formulation of moral judgments is not proposed, although it continues to be a necessary and indispensable moment in the ethical-normative process. In this phase, the moral specialist limits himself to highlighting the existing factual data and describing it as it is, in the most detailed and thorough way possible: he does not seek what it should be or the ideal towards which it tends, but what it actually is. the reality of the facts and how the moral phenomenon is characterized in them.
With this, it still does not fulfill its specific task, that of an evaluation process. Nor can it be said that by highlighting the factual data he takes a first step to then move on to evaluative reflection, which corresponds specifically to him, since in this phase he can very well receive the results offered by the various human sciences. and its specialists, without substituting them for it.
In this phase, which is typical of sociological, ethnological, historical, anthropological-cultural research, an attempt is made to highlight that moral phenomenon that is reified over time. in culture, in the praxis of socio-personal relations and in the mutual interference of the socio-political sphere with the individual-personal sphere.
From the epistemic point of view, therefore, the relationship that ethics establishes at this level with the other human sciences does not distinguish it in the least from those sciences that point out the various characteristics and polyhedral aspects of human reality or, in In other words, it does not make it ethical, but history, sociology, psychology, cultural anthropology, etc” according to the various occasions.
Indeed, for a reason there is a mutual and continuous interference of scientific interests between the historian, the sociologist, the anthropologist, the psychologist90, etc. and one who is interested in descriptive ethics. There is no invasion of foreign land or methodological overreach: the historian can and will have to be interested in the development of ethos, following the methodology of historical research, but also having a clear vision of the specific problems of ethical discourse; the moralist can and will have to be interested in the moral phenomena of the past, basing his investigation on the methodology of historical research. The same must be said of the relationship between ethics and the other human sciences.
But the human sciences can also offer the study of normative ethics the knowledge of that empirical-factual data that is essential for the formulation of moral judgment on any behavior.
For example, how to make a judgment about in vitro fertilization or genetic engineering if you don’t have all the technical-scientific data that characterizes this process?
From this point of view, which corresponds to the acceptance of the empirical premise in the syllogism with which the normative process of ethics is identified, for each action and for the various points of view from which it can be considered. One science or another will be heard more, namely, the one that is more directly interested in the operational context in which the normative process is being carried out.
When assessing, for example, IVF (in vitro fertilization), at first, its technical-scientific process must be carefully followed, distinguishing some of the numerous phases that constitute it: in this phase one cannot help but depend on the medical specialist in the sector. But in a second moment, or considering the problem from other points of view, one cannot help but follow the sociologist who attends to socio-sanitary problems, the psychologist who points out the possible consequences of such technology on the affected people and in particular on the unborn child, or to the specialist in health policy who presents the hospital situation that actually exists with the relative priorities to be given to the construction of a district hospital, a nursing home for the elderly or a clinic where it can be carried out IVF. Listening to the different points of view, which only the various human sciences can offer, means for the moralist to take into consideration the morally relevant elements inherent in the normative problem in order to submit them to an ethical evaluation. Indeed, building a district hospital or a nursing home for the elderly will mean, from an evaluative point of view, solving the problems of already existing people, while building an IVF clinic means taking care of already existing people, but above all all put in the world to people who do not yet exist.
The relationship of ethics with each of the human sciences is decisive: we will always have to listen carefully to the data they offer. But the methodology of these descriptive sciences must never be confused with the evaluative methodology of ethics.
S. Privitera
Bibl.: M. Cuvás, Biomedical progress challenges moral theology, in R, Latourelle (ed,), Vatican II Balance and perspectives, Follow me, Salamanca 1986, ,1121-1140; F Abel, Science and ethics in tension” and dialogue, in 1 Conference on scientific and ethical progress, Madrid 1990.
PACOMIO, Luciano, Encyclopedic Theological Dictionary, Divine Word, Navarra, 1995
Source: Encyclopedic Theological Dictionary