A state of mind in which one cannot decide between two or more alternatives, due to the lack of prevailing arguments in favor of one option.
Doubt is a condition of the intelligent man. As long as he is not, doubts do not exist and his persuasions are naive. But doubt cannot take over the healthy mind as a permanent system because man tends to the truth. It is a driving path of research, of search. Authentic truth is reached, in whole or in part, by certainty and security (which is something internal and subjective) or by evidence (which is something external and real).
Descartes spoke of “methodical doubt” when he suggested it as a way of walking in philosophical reflection. Cartesianism requires doubting everything and proving everything: it is the soul of objective science. In Cartesian rationalism one tends from safe presuppositions, from postulates. Otherwise, the science that gives the truth is left clear and distinct and falls into the belief that it is only opinion.
Doubts have a special meaning when they affect vital issues or sectors, such as those related to one’s own identity, one’s future, or religious beliefs. Then they produce restlessness and demand solution and clarity. To the extent that they are resolved, peace ensues. And, if they persist, anxiety and insecurity arise.
In a special way, it is the doubts in matters of faith that often make the honest person suffer. Doubts about God, salvation, revealed mysteries, religious duties, etc., must be seen by the educator as normal in certain ages or situations. But they must be treated with the originality of the religious, which is not the scientific, the social, the human.
In these situations, the educator must be respectful with those who do not see clearly in religious matters. He must help without coercing, suggest without manipulating, insinuate paths without trying to impose them. And he must remember that prayer, humility and freedom have more effect than arguments and speeches.
Pedro Chico González, Dictionary of Catechesis and Religious Pedagogy, Editorial Bruño, Lima, Peru 2006
Source: Dictionary of Catechesis and Religious Pedagogy
From the Latin duo, it etymologically indicates an uncertainty that oscillates between various points, both on a psychological level and in the order of theories of knowledge. In Socrates the doubt is inserted in the maveutic logic, which tries to overcome the appearance of opinion, while in Aristotle it is the moment a quo of every episteme that tries to turn its own knowledge into a problem. If in skepticism doubt becomes absolute as a consequence of the impossibility of reaching a knowledge of reality, with Christian thought (Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas) the methodical nature of doubt is underlined, which becomes an object of investigation criticism in relation to the question of truth. In F. Bacon, doubt has the function of representing the pars destruens of the method, and with Descartes it undergoes a methodical systematization for the “COgito”, which tries to deconstruct the building of knowledge in order to build it anew.
The extension of the field of doubt demonstrates in Descartes that the provisional nature of doubt intends to establish an indubitable evidence as a point from which one cannot return and as a criterion of an ulterior truth. Doubt, even within its hyperbolic character, is essential to the cogito. if man doubts, he thinks; and therefore moves in an absolute self-evidence.
In E. Husserl there is a decline in doubt in the epoche, which has the function of putting in parentheses all preconceptions that could be an obstacle to the phenomenological approach to the data of experience.
Thanks to this suspension, the indubitable character of the evidence in the intentionality of consciousness stands out. Closer to our days, we owe CS Peirce a recovery of the function of doubt, with his “pragmatic maxim”, in which the Belief and opinion, understood as responses to the solicitations of experience, shed some light on ideas. In the formation of beliefs, doubt in its methodical instance constantly stimulates a confrontation between beliefs and experience, with a view to the construction of common truths. In the new theories of knowledge, doubt belongs to the self-generation of thought and its dialogical character, which is made of antagonistic processes. It has a heuristic and control function in the balance of thought itself.
C Dotolo
Bibl.: Doubt, in DF, 1, 4S6-4S7. E, Gouiran, Existential interpretation of doubt, Mexico 1937.
PACOMIO, Luciano, Encyclopedic Theological Dictionary, Divine Word, Navarra, 1995
Source: Encyclopedic Theological Dictionary
The term indicates a state of uncertainty regarding a cause, person or event. In the NT it is generally used in one of two senses. It can indicate a state of being, a loss of understanding of some situations (Jn. 13:22; Acts 2:12, 10:17; Gal. 4:20). It implies a hesitation in acting, and may or may not be sinful.
Used in the second sense, it positively means a wavering in judgment caused by a lack of conviction, and in many cases by unbelief and skepticism (Mark 6:6; Rom. 14:23). Doubt can be resolved by further reasoning followed by action; or it may remain unresolved, and in which case it may become a sinful matter.
Doubt and moral laxity are closely related. 2 Thess. 2:10–12 carries the principle that much doubt proceeds from a rejection of the commands of revealed truth. Volitional doubt can become the pattern of one who rejects divine revelation and its claims.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ISBE, II, pp. 870s.
Harold B. Kuhn
ISBE International Standard Bible Encyclopaedia
Harrison, EF, Bromiley, GW, & Henry, CFH (2006). Dictionary of Theology (198). Grand Rapids, MI: Challenge Books.
Source: Dictionary of Theology
(Latin, dubium; Greek, aporí; French, doute; German, Zweifel).
A state in which the mind is torn between two contrary propositions and is unable to assent to either of them. Any number of alternative propositions on the same topic may be in doubt at the same time; but, strictly speaking, the doubt is ascribed separately to each one, as between the proposition and its contradictory, that is, each proposition may or may not be true. Doubt is opposed to certainty, or the mind’s adherence to a proposition without suspicion as to its truth, and furthermore to opinion, an adherence to a mental proposition coupled with such suspicion.
Doubt is positive or negative. In the first case, the evidence for and against is so balanced as to make a decision impossible; in the second, the doubt arises from the lack of sufficient evidence on each side. Thus, it is possible that a doubt can be positive on one side and negative on the other (positive-negative or negative-positive), that is, in cases where the evidence on one side is only obtainable and by itself does not reach a absolute proof, as, for example, in circumstantial evidence. In addition, the doubt can be theoretical or practical. The first has to do with abstract truth and error; the last with questions of duty or the legality of the actions, or of mere convenience.
A further distinction is made between doubt as to the existence of a particular fact (dubium facti) and doubt as to a precept or law (dubium juris). Prudent doubts are distinguished from reckless ones according to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the considerations on which the doubt is based. It should be noted that doubt is a purely subjective condition, that is, it only belongs to the mind that has to judge the facts, and is not applicable to the facts themselves. A proposition or theory that is commonly called doubtful, therefore, is one for which there is not enough evidence available to determine assent; itself must be true or false. Theories that at some point have been considered doubtful due to lack of sufficient evidence, frequently become true or false due to the discovery of new evidence.
Since certainty can be produced either by reason (which deals with evidence) or by faith (which rests on authority), it follows that theoretical doubt can likewise deal with the matter-subject of reason. or faith, that is, with philosophy or with religion. Practical doubt has to do with conduct; and since the conduct must be guided by the principles provided by reason or by faith, or by both together, the doubts to it consider the application of principles already accepted under one or another of the aforementioned categories. The solution of doubts of this kind is the sphere of moral theology, as far as questions of good and evil are concerned; and with respect to those of mere practical convenience, one must resort to scientific principles or of another type that properly belong to the subject-matter of the doubt. Thus, for example, doubts as to the actual occurrence of a historical event can only be resolved by consideration of the evidence; doubts as to the doctrine of the Sacraments, finding out what is of faith on the subject; doubts about the morality of a business transaction, by applying the authoritative decisions of moral theology; while the question of the wisdom or reversal of the trade in terms of profit and loss must be determined by trading knowledge and experience. The legitimacy, or the reverse, of doubt as regards matters of fact is made evident by the forms of logic (induction and deduction), which, whatever the scope of their function as a means of acquiring knowledge, they are indispensably necessary as proof of the correctness of the conclusions or hypotheses already formed.
doubt in philosophy
The validity of human perception and reasoning, in general, as guides to objective truth has often been questioned. The doubt thus posed has sometimes been of the so-called methodical, fictitious, or provisional character, and sometimes real or skeptical, since it embodies the conclusion that objective truth cannot be known. Doubt of the first kind is the necessary preliminary to all investigation, and in this sense Aristotle says (Metaph., III, I) that philosophy is “the art of well doubting.” Sir W. Hamilton points out (Lect. On Metaph. V) that doubt, as a preliminary to philosophical inquiry, is the only means by which the necessary elimination of prejudices can be accomplished; like Bacon’s method he insisted on the primary necessity of setting aside the “idols”, or prejudices, which naturally influence the minds of men. Thus, the scholastic proof of a proposition or thesis begins with the establishment of the “doubts”, or contrary arguments; after which the evidence of the thesis is given, and finally the doubts are resolved. Needless to say, this is the method…